



# Foundations of Quantitative Risk Measurement

## Chapter 1: Expected Utility Theory<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Chapter 1 from 'Managing and measuring actuarial risks', Dhaene, J., Denuit, M., Goovaerts, M., Kaas, R. & Linders, D. (2017), To be published.



### 1. Introduction

The choice under risk

Random variables and distributions

### 2. Expected utility

Utility functions

Risk aversion

Insurance

### 3. Integral stochastic orders

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- Examples of decision making problems:
  - ▶ *Individual*: bear a risk or insure it (partially)?
  - ▶ *Insurer*: accept a risk or not?
  - ▶ *Insurer*: reinsure (part of) the accepted risks?
- Optimal choice of the decision maker depends on:
  - ▶ his initial wealth,
  - ▶ his risk appetite.
- Theories of choice under risk:
  - ▶ Expected utility theory: Cramer (1728), Bernouilli 1738), Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947).
  - ▶ Dual theory of choice under risk: Yaari (1987), Roëll (1987), Schmeidler (1989).
- Common properties of these theories:
  - ▶ Preference relations of a decision maker are qualitative in nature,
  - ▶ but follow from comparing numerical quantities.

- Problem:

- ▶ *A fair coin is tossed repeatedly until it lands head up. The income you receive is equal to  $2^n$  if the first head appears on the  $n$ -th toss. How much are you willing to pay for this game?*

- Expected gain:

- ▶ Assume that the coin is fair.
- ▶ Probability to win the amount  $2^n$  is  $\frac{1}{2^n}$ .
- ▶ The expected gain:

$$\sum_{n=1}^{+\infty} (2^n) \times \frac{1}{2^n} = \sum_{n=1}^{+\infty} 1 = +\infty.$$

- Conclusions:

- ▶ A decision maker will not pay  $+\infty$ .
- ▶ The price to play this game will be modest.
- ▶ The expectation is not (always) a good method to value a game.

## Expected utility theory

- Classical expected utility theory:
  - ▶ Each decision maker assigns a utility  $u(x)$  to any fortune of amount  $x$ .
  - ▶ Utility functions are of a subjective nature.
  - ▶ 'Reasonable' utility functions share common properties:
    - ★ non-decreasingness,
    - ★ decreasing marginal utility.
- Expected utility and insurance:
  - ▶ Why is an individual willing to pay a premium larger than the average expected loss?
  - ▶ Why are certain insurance covers to be preferred over others?
  - ▶ Behavior of insureds:
    - ★ moral hazard,
    - ★ anti-selection.

# 1 – The St. Petersburg paradox

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## Solution of G. Cramer (1728) and D. Bernoulli (1738)

- Consider a decision maker with initial fortune  $w$ .
- He attaches a utility  $u(x)$  to a fortune  $x$ .
- The price to play the game is  $P$ .
- Assume our agent wins after  $n$  throws:
  - ▶ His utility if he wins after  $n$  throws:  $u(w - P + 2^n)$ .
  - ▶ Probability to win after  $n$  throws:  $\frac{1}{2^n}$ .
- Expected utility:
  - ▶ At initiation, the utility he will reach if he plays the game is unknown.
  - ▶ Expected utility:

$$\sum_{n=1}^{+\infty} u(w - P + 2^n) \frac{1}{2^n}.$$


## Solution of G. Cramer (1728) and D. Bernoulli (1738)

- The decision maker is an *expected utility maximizer*.
- If he doesn't play the game, his utility is  $u(w)$ .
- He is willing to play the coin tossing game for a price  $P$  if

$$u(w) \leq \sum_{n=1}^{+\infty} u(w - P + 2^n) \frac{1}{2^n}$$

- ▶ G. Cramer:  $u(x) = \sqrt{x}$ .
- ▶ D. Bernoulli:  $u(x) = \ln x$ .
- Example:
  - ▶ Take  $w = 10000$  and  $u(x) = \ln x$ .
  - ▶ Then  $P = 14.2385$ . (Check this using MatLab or Excel!)

# St. Petersburg Paradox





## Potential gains/losses

- A risk is an event solely due to the whims of fate that may or may not take place
  - ▶ and that brings about some financial loss,
  - ▶ or a financial gain.
- Examples:
  - ▶ For an insurer, a risk is a potential loss (e.g. car insurance);
  - ▶ For an investor, a risk is a potential gain (e.g. investment).
- A risk always contains uncertainty:
  - ▶ The event that may or may not take place,
  - ▶ or the severity of the consequences of its occurrence,
  - ▶ or the moment of its occurrence.
- Risk vs. loss:
  - ▶ ‘Risk’ and ‘loss’ are synonyms.
- Risks are modeled by random variables.

## R.v.'s defined on a probability space

- Consider a random experiment, defined on the probability space  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  :
  - ▶  $\Omega$  : set with all possible outcomes;
  - ▶  $\mathcal{F}$  subsets of  $\Omega$ , called events;
  - ▶  $\mathbb{P}$  : probability measure:

$\mathbb{P}[A] =$  probability that the realization lies in the set  $A \in \mathcal{F}$

- Definition:
  - ▶ A random variable  $X$  defined on  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$  is a *function* which attaches a *real number* to each possible outcome:

$$X : \Omega \longrightarrow \mathbb{R}.$$

- ▶  $\omega$  describes the state of a random phenomenon.
- ▶  $X(\omega)$  is a single aspect of the state  $\omega$ .

- Question: What is the probability that  $X(\omega)$  lies in the interval  $B$ ?

- ▶ Probability function  $\mathbb{P}$  assigns probabilities to subsets of  $\Omega$ .
- ▶ The set  $X^{-1}(B)$ <sup>2</sup>:

$$X^{-1}(B) = \{\omega | X(\omega) \in B\}$$

- ▶  $\mathbb{P}[X^{-1}(B)]$  = probability that  $X$  takes a value in  $B$ .
- ▶ Notation:

$$\mathbb{P}[X \in B] = \mathbb{P}[X^{-1}(B)].$$

- We assume that the probability  $\mathbb{P}[X \in B]$  is known.
- *The only uncertainty when considering a future random loss is the uncertainty about its particular future outcome, not the uncertainty about its 'distribution'.*

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<sup>2</sup>we silently assumed that  $X$  is a measurable function.

## cdf of a random variable

- Cumulative distribution function (cdf)  $F_X$  of the r.v.  $X$  :

$$F_X(x) = \mathbb{P}[X \leq x], \text{ for } x \in \mathbb{R}.$$

- ▶  $F_X$  is non-decreasing and right continuous.
- Assume  $F_X$  is constant on  $[a, b]$ .
  - ▶ Probability of ending in  $(a, b]$  is zero.
- Assume  $F_X$  has a jump of size  $\Delta(x)$  in  $x$  :
  - ▶  $\Delta(x) = F_X(x) - F_X(x-)$ .
  - ▶  $\Delta(x)$  is zero if  $F_X$  is continuous in  $x$ .
  - ▶ For all  $x \in \mathbb{R}$  :

$$\mathbb{P}[X = x] = \Delta(x).$$

## Expectation as a Riemann-Stieltjes integral

- The average or expected value of  $X$  is denoted by  $\mathbb{E}[X]$  :

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} x dF_X(x).$$

- If  $F_X$  has only a discrete part:

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = \sum_y y \Delta(y) = \sum_y y \mathbb{P}[X = y].$$

- If  $F_X$  has a discrete and continuous part:

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} x f_X(x) dx + \sum_y y \Delta(y).$$

▶  $f_X(x)dx =$  probability that  $X$  takes a value in the  $[x, x + dx]$ .

- Exercise:

▶ Consider a r.v.  $X$  which takes the value 0 or 1 with equal probability. Determine the cdf  $F_X$  and  $\mathbb{E}[X]$ .

### Utility functions

#### Definition (Utility function)

A **utility function**  $u$  is a real-valued *non-decreasing* function asserting a decision maker's utility-of-wealth  $u(x)$  to each possible level of wealth  $x$ .

- Decision makers have *non-negative marginal utility*: more wealth is always preferred over less wealth.
- In general, different decision makers will have different utility functions.
- We study classes of decision makers, which all share some common risk preferences

### Expected utility

- Consider a decision maker having initial wealth  $w$  and facing a loss  $X$ .
- Wealth after suffering the loss  $X$  :

$$w - X.$$

- Utility level after suffering the loss  $X$

$$u(w - X).$$

▶  $u(w - X)$  is a r.v.

- The expected utility is the quantity:

$$\mathbb{E} [u(w - X)].$$

### Profit-seeking decision makers

- The expected utility hypothesis:

Prefer loss  $X$  over loss  $Y \iff \mathbb{E}[u(w - X)] \geq \mathbb{E}[u(w - Y)]$ ,

Indifferent between  $X$  and  $Y \iff \mathbb{E}[u(w - X)] = \mathbb{E}[u(w - Y)]$ .

- ▶ Relations as above hold 'provided the expectations exist'.
  - ▶ The decision maker is said to be an *expected utility maximizer*.
  - ▶ Indifferent between losses with the same distribution.
- Standardized utility functions:
    - ▶ A utility function only needs to be determined up to positive linear transformations.
      - ★ Exercise: prove this statement!
    - ▶ Standardize the utility function  $u$ :

$$u(x_0) = 0 \text{ and } u'(x_0) = 1, \text{ for some } x_0 \in \mathbb{R}.$$



### Transformed wealth levels

- Axiomatic framework - Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947):
  - ▶ *Any decision maker whose behavior is in accordance with a given set of 'rational' axioms, is an expected utility maximizer.*
- The 'independence axiom':
  - ▶ For any random losses  $X$ ,  $Y$  and  $Z$  and for any Bernoulli r.v.  $I$ , independent of  $X$ ,  $Y$  and  $Z$ , one has:
    - Prefer loss  $X$  over loss  $Y$
    - $\Rightarrow$  Prefer loss  $IX + (1 - I)Z$  over loss  $IY + (1 - I)Z$
  - ▶ Example.

#### Definition (concave function)

A real-valued function  $f$ , defined on the interval  $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ , is **concave** on  $I$  if for any  $x_1, x_2 \in I$  and any  $t \in [0, 1]$ ,

$$f(tx_1 + (1-t)x_2) \geq tf(x_1) + (1-t)f(x_2)$$

- $f$  is **convex** on the interval  $I$  if  $(-f)$  is concave on  $I$ .
- Assume  $f$  is twice differentiable:
  - ▶  $f$  is concave  $\Leftrightarrow f''(x) \leq 0$ , for all  $x \in I$ .
  - ▶  $f$  is convex  $\Leftrightarrow f''(x) \geq 0$ , for all  $x \in I$ .
- $f$  is concave  $\Rightarrow f$  is continuous.

### Definition (Risk averse decision makers)

A decision maker is **risk averse** if his utility function  $u$  is concave on its domain.

- Risk averse decision makers have *decreasing marginal utility*.
  - ▶ Assume you gain the amount  $\Delta$ .
  - ▶ Increase in utility:  $u(x + \Delta) - u(x)$ .
  - ▶ For risk averse decision makers, the increase in utility is a decreasing function of the wealth level  $x$ .
- Interpretation:
  - ▶ As more wealth is available, less 'moral value' is placed on earning an additional Euro.

#### Theorem (Jensen's inequality (1906))

$$f \text{ is concave} \Rightarrow \mathbb{E} [f(Y)] \leq f(\mathbb{E}[Y])$$

- Corollary: If  $u$  is a concave utility function, then

$$\mathbb{E} [u(w - X)] \leq u(w - \mathbb{E}[X]).$$

- ▶ Exercise: prove this inequality.
- The risk averse decision maker's attitude towards risk:
  - ▶ Prefer certainty over uncertainty with the same expectation.
- The risk averse decision maker's attitude towards wealth:
  - ▶ Decreasing marginal utility.

### Expected utility and risk aversion

- Definition:

A decision maker is *risk neutral* if

$$u(x) = ax + b$$

for given constants  $a > 0$  and  $b$ .

- In this case, the expected utility hypothesis coincides with comparing expected values.
- The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion:

$$r(x) = \frac{-u''(x)}{u'(x)} = -\frac{d}{dx} \ln(u'(x))$$

For any risk averse decision maker, we have that  $r \geq 0$ .

### Expected utility and insurance

- Risk averse individual:
  - ▶ facing a loss  $X \geq 0$ ,
  - ▶ utility function  $u(x)$ ,
  - ▶ initial wealth  $w$ .
- Risk averse insurer:
  - ▶ accepts  $X$  for a premium  $P$ ,
  - ▶ utility function  $U$ ,
  - ▶ initial wealth  $W$ .
- Under what conditions is an insurance contract feasible?
  - ▶ From the viewpoint of the individual,
  - ▶ from the viewpoint of the insurer.

### Expected utility and insurance

- Viewpoint of the individual:

- ▶ He is only willing to underwrite the insurance if

$$u(w - P) \geq \mathbb{E}[u(w - X)].$$

- ▶ There exists always a premium  $P^M$  such that

$$u(w - P^M) = \mathbb{E}[u(w - X)].$$

- ★  $u$  is non-decreasing.
- ★  $u$  is concave, hence also continuous.
- ★  $P^M$  is the maximum premium the insured is willing to pay.

- From Jensen's inequality:

$$P^M \geq \mathbb{E}[X].$$

- ▶ Exercise: prove this inequality.

### Expected utility and insurance

- Viewpoint of the insurer:

- ▶ He is willing to insure the risk  $X$  at a premium  $P$  if

$$U(W) \leq \mathbb{E}[U(W + P - X)].$$

- ▶ Minimal premium  $P^m$  he requires follows from

$$U(W) = \mathbb{E}[U(W + P^m - X)].$$

- ▶ From Jensen's inequality:

$$P^m \geq \mathbb{E}[X].$$

★ Exercise: prove this inequality.

- Condition for an insurance contract to be feasible:

$$P^m \leq P \leq P^M$$



### Expected utility and mutual exclusivity

- Definition:

- ▶ The random vector  $(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n)$  is said to be mutually exclusive if the following conditions hold:

$$\mathbb{P} [X_i \neq 0, X_j \neq 0] = 0, \quad \forall i \neq j$$

- Examples of mutual exclusive couples:

- ▶ Insurance with a franchise deductible:

$$\varphi(X) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } X \leq d \\ X & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \text{and } X - \varphi(X) = \begin{cases} X & \text{if } X \leq d \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- ▶ Term insurance with doubled capital in case of accidental death.
- ▶ Endowment insurance.

#### Theorem (Additivity property of mutual exclusive losses)

*Consider a utility function  $u$ , satisfying  $u(w) = 0$ . If  $X$  and  $Y$  are mutual exclusive losses, then*

$$\mathbb{E} [u(w - X - Y)] = \mathbb{E} [u(w - X)] + \mathbb{E} [u(w - Y)].$$

- A general utility function  $u$  can always be standardized such that  $u(w) = 0$ .
- Interpretation:
  - ▶ The utility after bearing the loss  $X + Y$  is the sum of the individual expected utilities.

#### Introduction: ordering of risks

- The perception of risk is captured in a utility function  $u$ :

$u(x)$  = moral value of having a wealth equal to  $x$ .

- A decision maker is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer:

- ▶ for a decision maker with utility function  $u$ , loss  $X$  is 'more preferable' than loss  $Y$  if:

$$\mathbb{E} [u(w - X)] \geq \mathbb{E} [u(w - Y)].$$

- ▶ there may exist another decision maker with utility function  $v$ , who prefers  $Y$  over  $X$ .

- The notion 'more preferable' depends on:

- ▶ the distribution of the risk itself;
- ▶ the risk preferences of a particular decision maker.

#### The concept 'more preferable'

- Equality in distribution:

- ▶ Two r.v.'s  $X$  and  $Y$  are said to be equal in distribution if:

$$F_X(x) = F_Y(x), \text{ for all } x \in \mathbb{R}.$$

- ▶ Notation:  $X \stackrel{d}{=} Y$ .

- If  $X \stackrel{d}{=} Y$ , **all** decision makers will be indifferent between risk  $X$  and risk  $Y$ .
- If  $X \not\stackrel{d}{=} Y$ , the notion 'more preferable' should be based on the distribution of the loss alone, not on a particular utility function.

#### Definition

- A decision maker's utility function  $u$  is in general unknown.
- Group all 'reasonable' decision makers in a class  $\mathcal{U}$ .
- $u(-X)$  represents the utility of a decision maker with zero initial wealth, after suffering the loss  $X$ .
- Integral stochastic order based on the class  $\mathcal{U}$ :

$$X \preceq_{\mathcal{U}} Y \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{E}[u(-X)] \geq \mathbb{E}[u(-Y)] \text{ for all } u \in \mathcal{U}.$$

- Interpretation:
  - ▶ All decision makers with zero initial wealth and belonging to the class  $\mathcal{U}$  prefer the loss  $X$  over  $Y$ .

- Consider two losses  $X$  and  $Y$ , for which  $X \preceq_{\mathcal{U}} Y$ .
- Consider a decision maker with utility function  $u$  and initial wealth  $w$ .
  - ▶ The decision maker prefers  $X$  over  $Y$  if

$$\mathbb{E} [u(w - X)] \geq \mathbb{E} [u(w - Y)]. \quad (1)$$

- ▶  $X \preceq_{\mathcal{U}} Y$  does not necessarily imply (1).
- Assumption concerning  $\mathcal{U}$ :
  - ▶ Define the utility function  $v$  as:  $v(x) = u(w + x)$ .

$$u \in \mathcal{U} \Rightarrow v \in \mathcal{U}.$$

- Interpretation:
  - ▶ The preference of  $X$  over  $Y$  does not depend on the initial wealth.

### Applications

- Consider an insurer facing the risk  $X$ .
- The cdf of  $X$  will in general be unknown or too cumbersome to work with.
  - ▶ The only information available is that  $X$  belongs to some class:

$$X \in \mathcal{A}.$$

- Picking a particular member of  $\mathcal{A}$  will lead to **model risk**.
- Making the wrong choice can lead to serious underestimation of the real risk.

### Applications

- Replace the loss  $X$  by  $Y$ , such that for every  $Z \in \mathcal{A}^3$ :

$$Z \preceq_{\mathcal{U}} Y.$$

- The r.v.  $Y$  describes a *worst case scenario*.
- Calculating actuarial quantities for  $Y$  is a '*prudent strategy*'.
- References:
  - ▶ Exotic option pricing: Schoutens, Simons & Tistaert (2004).
  - ▶ Risk measures: Barrieu & Scandolo (2013).

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<sup>3</sup>For simplicity we assume that such  $Y$  exists.



### Losses versus gains

- If  $X$  denotes a loss:

- ▶ high positive values are big losses;
- ▶ prefer loss  $X$  over  $Y$  if

$$\mathbb{E} [u(w - X)] \geq \mathbb{E} [u(w - Y)].$$

- ▶  $-X$  is a r.v. representing gains.

- If  $X$  denotes a gain:

- ▶ negative values are losses;
- ▶ prefer gain  $Y$  over  $X$  if

$$\mathbb{E} [u(w + X)] \leq \mathbb{E} [u(w + Y)].$$

- ▶  $-X$  is a loss r.v.

## Definition (Stochastic dominance)

Two r.v.'s  $X$  and  $Y$  are ordered in the stochastic dominance sense, notation  $X \preceq_{st} Y$  if

$$\mathbb{E}[u(-X)] \geq \mathbb{E}[u(-Y)],$$

for all non-decreasing function  $u$ .

- The class  $\mathcal{U}$  is:

$$\mathcal{U} = \{u \mid u \text{ is a non-decreasing utility function}\}.$$

- $\mathcal{U}$  is the class of all decision makers who prefer more over less wealth.
- Interpretation:
  - ▶ If  $X \preceq_{st} Y$ , **all** decision makers will prefer  $X$  over  $Y$ .
  - ▶ Replacing loss  $X$  by loss  $Y$  is a prudent strategy.

### Losses versus gains

- $u(x)$  is non-decreasing  $\Leftrightarrow -u(-x)$  is non-decreasing.
  - ▶ For a non-decreasing utility function  $u$ , define the function  $v$  as

$$v(x) = -u(-x). \quad (2)$$

- ▶ The function  $v$  is again a utility function in the class  $\mathcal{U}$ .
- Stochastic dominance in terms of gains:

$$X \preceq_{st} Y \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{E}[v(X)] \leq \mathbb{E}[v(Y)],$$

for  $v$  a non-decreasing utility function.

- Interpretation:

- ▶  $X \preceq_{st} Y$  means that a gain  $Y$  is more attractive than a gain  $X$ .

### Characterization in terms of the cdf

- Characterization of stochastic dominance:

$$X \preceq_{st} Y \Leftrightarrow F_X(x) \geq F_Y(x), \quad \text{for all } x \in \mathbb{R}.$$

- Other characterization:

$$X \preceq_{st} Y \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{P}[X > x] \leq \mathbb{P}[Y > x], \quad \text{for all } x \in \mathbb{R}.$$

- Interpretation:

- ▶ For losses: prefer the risk which has the smallest upper tail and largest lower tail.
- ▶ For gains: prefer the risk which has the largest upper tail and smallest lower tail.

- Smaller loss  $X$  is equivalent with a larger gain  $-X$ :

$$X \preceq_{st} Y \Leftrightarrow -Y \preceq_{st} -X.$$

### Stochastic dominance and ordered means

- The expected value  $\mathbb{E}[X]$ :

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = - \int_{-\infty}^0 F_X(x) dx + \int_0^{+\infty} (1 - F_X(x)) dx.$$

- Difference in means in terms of cdf's:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y] - \mathbb{E}[X] = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} (F_X(x) - F_Y(x)) dx.$$

- ▶ Exercise: Prove that this implication holds.

- Stochastic dominance implies ordered means:

$$X \preceq_{st} Y \Rightarrow \mathbb{E}[X] \leq \mathbb{E}[Y].$$

- ▶ Exercise: Prove that this implication holds.

## Capturing a distribution in a real number

## Theorem

Consider two r.v.'s  $X$  and  $Y$ . Then the following statements are equivalent:

1

$$X \preceq_{st} Y \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}[X] = \mathbb{E}[Y].$$

2

$$X \stackrel{d}{=} Y$$

- Proof: Good exercise to try at home.
- Interpretation:
  - ▶ Consider two losses  $X$  and  $Y$  with  $X \preceq_{st} Y$ .
  - ▶ Then, the mean is sufficient to characterize the losses.
  - ▶ If  $\mathbb{E}[X] = \mathbb{E}[Y]$ , any decision maker will be indifferent between the losses  $X$  and  $Y$ .

## Definition

## Definition (Stop-loss order)

Two r.v.'s  $X$  and  $Y$  are ordered in the stop-loss order sense, notation  $X \preceq_{sl} Y$  if

$$\mathbb{E}[u(-X)] \geq \mathbb{E}[u(-Y)],$$

for all non-decreasing and **concave** functions  $u$ .

- The class  $\mathcal{U}$  is:

$$\mathcal{U} = \{u \mid u \text{ is a non-decreasing and } \mathbf{concave} \text{ utility function}\}.$$

- $\mathcal{U}$  is the class of all **risk-averse** decision makers.
- Interpretation:
  - ▶ If  $X \preceq_{sl} Y$ , all risk-averse decision makers will prefer  $X$  over  $Y$ .
  - ▶ Replacing loss  $X$  by loss  $Y$  is a prudent strategy.

### Losses versus gains

- Relating convex and concave functions:
  - ▶ The following statements are equivalent:
    - ★  $u(x)$  is non-decreasing and concave,
    - ★  $v(x) = -u(-x)$  is non-decreasing and convex.

- Alternative definition for stop-loss order:

- ▶  $X \preceq_{sl} Y$  if, and only if,

$$\mathbb{E} [v(X)] \leq \mathbb{E} [v(Y)],$$

for all non-decreasing convex functions  $v$ .

- ▶  $v$  is not a utility function of a **risk-averse** decision maker.
- ▶ Stop-loss order has no interpretation in terms of gains when considering **risk-averse** decision makers.



## Example: Reinsurance

- Reinsurance:

- ▶ Total risk of an insurer =  $X$ .
- ▶ The insurer moves the biggest losses to the reinsurer.
  - ★ Insurer pays the losses below  $K$ :

$$\text{Payments of Insurer} = \begin{cases} X, & \text{if } X \leq K \\ K, & \text{if } X > K. \end{cases}$$

- ★ The reinsurer starts paying when the losses exceed the threshold  $K$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Payments of Reinsurer} &= \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } X \leq K \\ X - K, & \text{if } X > K \end{cases} \\ &\stackrel{\text{notation}}{=} (X - K)_+ \end{aligned}$$

- Expected payment of the **reinsurer**:  $\mathbb{E} [(X - K)_+]$ .

- ▶  $\mathbb{E} [(X - K)_+]$  gives information about the big losses, which have to be paid by the reinsurer.

### Example: Call option

- $X$  denotes the price of a stock (e.g. Apple) at some future date  $T$  (e.g. one year).
- Call option
  - ▶ A **call option** with strike  $K$  and maturity  $T$  gives the buyer the right to buy the stock at time  $T$  for the price  $K$ .
  - ▶ The buyer will benefit from this product when the stock price increases.
- At maturity, the buyer will receive a pay-off equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Pay-off at maturity} &= \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } X \leq K \\ X - K, & \text{if } X > K \end{cases} \\ &\stackrel{\text{notation}}{=} (X - K)_+. \end{aligned}$$

- The expected pay-off is given by:

$$\mathbb{E} [(X - K)_+].$$

## Definition

The stop-loss premium of the r.v.  $X$  with retention  $K$  is given by


$$\mathbb{E} [(X - K)_+].$$

- It can be proven that:

$$\mathbb{E} [(X - K)_+] = \int_K^{+\infty} (1 - F_X(x)) dx.$$

- Interpretation:

- ▶ Upper tail at level  $K$ .
- ▶  $\mathbb{E} [(X - K)_+]$  is the surface between the cdf  $F_X$  and the constant function 1, from  $K$  to  $+\infty$ .



### Measures for the upper tail

- Stop-loss transform:

- ▶  $\pi_X(x) = \mathbb{E} [(X - x)_+]$ .
- ▶  $\pi_X$  is strictly decreasing and convex.

- The stop-loss transform characterizes the distribution of  $X$ :

$$\pi'_X(x+) = F_X(x) - 1,$$

for  $x \in \mathbb{R}$ .

- ▶  $\pi'_X(x+)$  is the right derivative of the function  $\pi_X$  in the point  $x$ .

- Alternative definition for stop-loss order:

- ▶  $X \preceq_{sl} Y \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{E} [(X - K)_+] \leq \mathbb{E} [(Y - K)_+]$ , for all  $K \in \mathbb{R}$ .
- ▶  $X \preceq_{sl} Y$  means that  $X$  has uniformly smaller upper tails than  $Y$ .

**Theorem (Crossing condition for stop-loss order)**

*If for two r.v.'s, there is a real number  $c$  such that*

$$F_X(x) \leq F_Y(x), \quad \text{for all } x < c,$$

$$F_X(x) \geq F_Y(x), \quad \text{for all } x \geq c,$$

*and if also  $\mathbb{E}[X] \leq \mathbb{E}[Y]$ , then*

$$X \preceq_{sl} Y.$$

- Exercise: Give a graphical proof of this Theorem.

### Definition

#### Definition (Second degree stochastic dominance)

Two r.v.'s  $X$  and  $Y$  are ordered in the Second degree stochastic dominance sense, notation  $X \preceq_{sst} Y$ , if

$$\mathbb{E}[u(X)] \leq \mathbb{E}[u(Y)],$$

for all non-decreasing and **concave** functions  $u$ .

- The class  $\mathcal{U}$  is:

$$\mathcal{U} = \{u \mid u \text{ is a non-decreasing and } \mathbf{concave} \text{ utility function}\}.$$

- $\mathcal{U}$  is the class of all **risk-averse** decision makers.
- Interpretation:
  - ▶ If  $X \preceq_{sl} Y$ , all risk-averse decision makers will prefer gain  $Y$  over  $X$ .

## Example: Put option

- $X$  denotes the price of a stock (e.g. Apple) at some future date  $T$  (e.g. one year).
- Put Option
  - ▶ A **put option** with strike  $K$  and maturity  $T$  gives the buyer the right to sell the stock at time  $T$  for the price  $K$ .
  - ▶ The buyer will benefit from this product when the stock price decreases.
- At maturity, the buyer will receive a pay-off equal to:

$$\text{Pay-off at maturity} = \begin{cases} K - X, & \text{if } X \leq K \\ 0, & \text{if } X > K. \end{cases}$$

notation  $\equiv (K - X)_+$

- The expected pay-off is given by:

$$\mathbb{E} [(K - X)_+].$$




- Measure the lower tail using  $\mathbb{E} [(K - X)_+]$ .
- It can be proven that:

$$\mathbb{E} [(K - X)_+] = \int_{-\infty}^K F_X(x) dx.$$

- Interpretation:
  - ▶ Lower tail at level  $K$ .
- lower tail transform:
  - ▶  $\lambda_X(x) = \mathbb{E} [(x - X)_+]$
  - ▶ A distribution is characterized by its lower tail transform:

$$\lambda'_X(x+) = F_X(x).$$



### Losses versus gains

- 2nd degree stochastic dominance has no interpretation in terms of losses for risk-averse decision makers.
- Stop-loss and 2nd degree stochastic dominance:

$$X \preceq_{sst} Y \Leftrightarrow -Y \preceq_{sl} -X$$

- Alternative definition:

$$X \preceq_{sst} Y \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{E} [(K - X)_+] \geq \mathbb{E} [(K - Y)_+], \text{ for all } K \in \mathbb{R}.$$

- Interpretation:

- ▶ The larger the lower tails of a gain, the less attractive this gain has to be considered.

## Definition (Crossing condition for sst-order)

If for two r.v.'s, there is a real number  $c$  such that

$$F_X(x) \geq F_Y(x), \quad \text{for all } x < c,$$

$$F_X(x) \leq F_Y(x), \quad \text{for all } x \geq c,$$

and if also  $\mathbb{E}[X] \leq \mathbb{E}[Y]$ , then

$$X \preceq_{sst} Y.$$

- Exercise: Give a graphical proof of this Theorem.

## Definition

## Definition (Convex order)

Two r.v.'s  $X$  and  $Y$  are ordered in the convex order sense, notation  $X \preceq_{cx} Y$  if

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = \mathbb{E}[Y] \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{E}[u(-X)] \geq \mathbb{E}[u(-Y)],$$

for all non-decreasing and **concave** functions  $u$ .

- $\mathcal{U}$  is the class of all risk-averse decision makers.
- Convex order gives the preferences of risk-averse decision makers between losses with the **same mean**.
- Interpretation:
  - ▶ A loss  $X$  is replaced by a less attractive r.v.  $Y$ , 'which is the same on average'.

- Connection between upper and lower tail:

$$\mathbb{E} [(X - K)_+] = \mathbb{E} [(K - X)_+] + \mathbb{E} [X] - K.$$

- This expression is called the **put-call parity** and has (in a modified form) wide applications in option pricing theory.
- The put-call parity can be proven in a graphical way, using the following expressions:

$$\mathbb{E} [X] = - \int_{-\infty}^0 F_X(x) dx + \int_0^{+\infty} (1 - F_X(x)) dx,$$

$$\mathbb{E} [(X - K)_+] = \int_K^{+\infty} (1 - F_X(x)) dx,$$

$$\mathbb{E} [(K - X)_+] = \int_{-\infty}^K F_X(x) dx.$$

## Ordered upper and lower tails

- Convex order and stop-loss order:

$$X \preceq_{cx} Y \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{E}[X] = \mathbb{E}[Y] \quad \text{and} \quad X \preceq_{sl} Y$$

- Convex order and upper tail transform:

$$X \preceq_{cx} Y \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} \mathbb{E}[X] = \mathbb{E}[Y], \\ \mathbb{E}[(X - K)_+] \leq \mathbb{E}[(Y - K)_+], \quad \text{for all } K, \end{cases}$$

- ▶ Follows directly from the definition of stop-loss order.

- Convex order and lower tail transform:

$$X \preceq_{cx} Y \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} \mathbb{E}[X] = \mathbb{E}[Y], \\ \mathbb{E}[(K - X)_+] \leq \mathbb{E}[(K - Y)_+], \quad \text{for all } K, \end{cases}$$

- ▶ Follows directly from the put-call parity.

## Ordered upper and lower tails

- Convex order and second degree stochastic dominance:

$$X \preceq_{cx} Y \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{E}[X] = \mathbb{E}[Y] \quad \text{and} \quad Y \preceq_{sst} X$$

- ▶ Follows directly from the definition of 2nd degree stochastic order.

- Convex order and lower and upper tail transforms:

$$\begin{aligned} X \preceq_{cx} Y &\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} X \preceq_{sl} Y, \\ Y \preceq_{sst} X, \end{cases} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} \mathbb{E}[(X - K)_+] \leq \mathbb{E}[(Y - K)_+], & \text{for all } K, \\ \mathbb{E}[(K - X)_+] \leq \mathbb{E}[(K - Y)_+], & \text{for all } K, \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ The proof of  $\Rightarrow$  follows from previous relations.



## Comparing variability of risks

- Convex order and convex/concave functions:

$$X \preceq_{cx} Y \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{E}[u(X)] \leq \mathbb{E}[u(Y)],$$

for all convex functions  $u$ .

- $X \preceq_{cx} Y$  implies
  - ▶  $Y$  has heavier upper tails than  $X$ ,
  - ▶  $Y$  has heavier lower tails than  $X$ .
- Convex order has an interpretation in terms of losses and gains.

$$X \preceq_{cx} Y \Leftrightarrow -X \preceq_{cx} -Y.$$

- R.v.  $X$  is 'less variable' than r.v.  $Y$ .

## Theorem

If for two r.v.'s  $X$  and  $Y$  a real number  $c$  exists such that

$$\begin{aligned} F_X(x) &\leq F_Y(x) \text{ for all } x < c, \\ F_X(x) &\geq F_Y(x) \text{ for } x \geq c, \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

and moreover  $\mathbb{E}[X] = \mathbb{E}[Y]$ , then  $X \preceq_{cx} Y$ .

- Exercise:

## Lemma

For any  $a \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $u(X)$  can be expressed as

$$u(X) = u(a) + u'(a)(X - a) + \int_{-\infty}^a u''(K)(K - X)_+ dK \quad (4) \\ + \int_a^{+\infty} u''(K)(X - K)_+ dK.$$

- At a certain time, one has to pay the amount  $u(X)$ .
- The pay-off  $u(X)$  can be decomposed using:
  - ▶ pay-off of call options:  $(X - K)_+$ ,
  - ▶ pay-off of put options:  $(K - X)_+$ .
- Pay-offs of the form  $(X - K)_+$  and  $(K - X)_+$  are the building blocks for more complex pay-offs.

<sup>4</sup>see Carr & Madan (2001) and Cheung, Dhaene, Kukush & Linders (2013)

## Lemma

For a r.v.  $X$ , we can decompose  $\mathbb{E}[u(X)]$  as

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[u(X)] = & u(\mathbb{E}[X]) + \int_{-\infty}^{\mathbb{E}[X]} u''(K) \mathbb{E}[(K - X)_+] dK \\ & + \int_{\mathbb{E}[X]}^{+\infty} u''(K) \mathbb{E}[(X - K)_+] dK.\end{aligned}$$

- For a risk-averse decision maker, the expected utility  $\mathbb{E}[u(X)]$  can be written as  
the utility of  $\mathbb{E}[X]$  + portion of the tails.
- If  $u''(x) \leq 0$ , we immediately find Jensen's inequality:

$$\mathbb{E}[u(X)] \leq u(\mathbb{E}[X]).$$


## Example: Variance

- Variance decomposition formula

- ▶ Take  $u(x) = (x - \mathbb{E}[X])^2$ , then:

$$\frac{1}{2} \text{Var}[X] = \int_{-\infty}^{\mathbb{E}[X]} \mathbb{E}[(K - X)_+] \, dK + \int_{\mathbb{E}[X]}^{+\infty} \mathbb{E}[(X - K)_+] \, dK.$$

- Graphical representation:



### Capturing a distribution in a real number

- Convex ordered r.v.'s:

- ▶ We can prove that  $X \preceq_{cx} Y$ , then

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (\mathbb{E} [(Y - K)_+] - \mathbb{E} [(X - K)_+]) dK = \frac{1}{2} (\text{Var}[Y] - \text{Var}[X]).$$

- ▶ Comparing variances is meaningful when comparing SL-premiums of convex ordered r.v.'s.
- ▶ If  $X \preceq_{cx} Y$ , then  $\text{Var}[X] \leq \text{Var}[Y]$ .

- The following statements are equivalent:

- ▶  $X \preceq_{cx} Y$  and  $\text{Var}[Y] = \text{Var}[X]$
- ▶  $X \stackrel{d}{=} Y$ .

## Theorem

Consider the r.v.'s  $X$  and  $Y$ . Let  $u$  be a strictly concave function such that  $\mathbb{E}[u(Y)]$  is finite.

Then

$$X \preceq_{cx} Y \text{ and } \mathbb{E}[u(X)] = \mathbb{E}[u(Y)] \quad (5)$$

is equivalent with

$$X \stackrel{d}{=} Y. \quad (6)$$

- The function  $u$  has to have an absolutely continuous derivative to ensure all integrals are well-defined.
- The results hold for concave/convex twice differentiable utility functions.
- The condition  $\mathbb{E}[u(X)] = \mathbb{E}[u(Y)]$  can be replaced by  $\mathbb{E}[u(-X)] = \mathbb{E}[u(-Y)]$ .

- Consider a decision maker with a strictly concave and twice differentiable utility function:

$$u''(x) < 0.$$

- He has to choose between two convex ordered gains:

$$X \preceq_{cx} Y.$$

- The decision maker values  $X$  using the **whole** distribution.
- If he prefers  $X$  over  $Y$ :

$$\mathbb{E}[u(X)] > \mathbb{E}[u(Y)],$$

then  $X$  and  $Y$  cannot be equal (in distribution).

- If he is indifferent between  $X$  and  $Y$ , any other decision maker will be indifferent.



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